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ASSESSING THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF OMAN*
Compared to neighboring Saudi Arabia, there is very little press coverage on 
Oman. And unlike the many stories about how bad things are in the kingdom, the 
little reporting done on the sultanate is generally positive. It would be a mistake, 
however, to conclude from Oman’s glowing press coverage that all is well there. 
Oman, in fact, is experiencing some very difficult problems that are likely to get 
worse in coming years.
Oman faces challenges both on the economic and political fronts. In the 
economic realm, the sultanate’s main problem is easy to identify: its oil reserves 
are decreasing while its population is increasing. Problems in the political realm, 
by contrast, are harder to identify and assess sińce obtaining information about 
Omani politics -  especially opposition sentiment and activity -  is extremely dif­
ficult. This is due to the relatively limited amount of media and academic attention 
devoted to Oman, the difficulty of gaining entry into the Sultanate, and the reticen- 
ce of Omanis (either in Oman or elsewhere) about talking openly with foreigners 
about this subject.
Nevertheless, there have been indications over the past decade that there is 
frustration and discontent not just with some of the Sultan’s policies, but also with 
his rule. The possibility of a succession crisis upon his death also raises the possi- 
bility of instability.
This article will examine both the economic and political problems of 
Oman, and assess their implications for the stability of the sultanate. It will show 
that while the rule of the sułtan does not appear to be in any immediate danger, 
there is a significant possibility that Oman’s problems could exceed the ability of
* The earlier version of this article was published in the “Middle East Review of International Affairs Jo­
urnal” (MERIA), vol. 8, no. 3, September 2004, http://meria.idc.ac.il.
its govemment to deal with them effectively. Such a development, especially com- 
bined with a succession crisis, could affect the stability and even the viability of the 
sultanate.
Economic problems
In contrast to several Gulf states, Oman possesses relatively modest oil reserves. 
The obvious implication of this is that Oman is going to have to adjust to life wi­
thout oil long before its more richly endowed neighbors.
Until recently, it was believed that new discoveries of oil in Oman were not 
only sufficient to replace what was being produced, but even to add to Oman’s 
reserves. In 2003, Oman’s proven oil reserves were estimated at 5.7 billion bar- 
rels1. But while Oman’s oil reserves were reportedly rising, its production was 
declining from a high of 960,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2000 to about 700,000 
bpd by early 20042. More ominously, it was revealed in early 2004 that Royal Du- 
tch/Shell overstated its Omani reserves by a whopping 40 percent3.
Royal Dutch/Shell owns a 34 percent share of Petroleum Development 
Oman (PDO), which produces 90 percent of the sultanate’s oil (the Omani 
govemment owns a 60 percent share)4. Since it is unlikely that Royal Dutch/Shell 
and the Omani govemment had different estimates of PDO’s oil reserves, (i.e., it is 
doubtful that the Omani govemment had a lower, more accurate estimate of PDO’s 
reserves than Royal Dutch/Shell), the 40 percent overstatement appears to affect all 
of PDO’s proven reserves estimates. If this is true, and assuming that the non-PDO 
share of Omani oil reserves has been accurately stated, then Oman’s total proven 
oil reserves are not 5.7 billion barrels, but more like 4.2 billion barrels instead.
At current rates of production, this level of reserves would take only 16.5 
years to deplete instead of 22 years (at higher production rates that Oman achieved 
in the recent past, its oil reserves would run out even more ąuickly)5. More oil will 
undoubtedly be found in Oman, just as has happened before. But it will have to be 
found in much greater ąuantities than before in order to significantly push back the 
time frame when Oman’s oil reserves are expected to run out.
Oil, though, is not Oman’s only source of wealth; it also has natural gas. 
Oman’s natural gas reserves reportedly went from 12.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 
1992 to almost 30 tcf in 2003, with as much as another 2 tcf expected. These figu-
' “The World Factbook 2004. Oman”, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) website, http://www.cia.gov/ 
cia/publications/factbook/print/mu.html.
2 BP Statistical Review o f World Energy, London, June 2001, p. 4, 7; and J. A li, GCC lnsights: Oman’s 
Budget Shows a Delermination to Grow, “Gulf News” (Internet version), January 12, 2004, transcribed by Federal 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 12, 2004.
3 “Shell Raised Oman Oil Reserves as Output Fell-NYT”, Reuters, April 8, 2004; and J. G erth and 
S. L ab aton , Oman Oil Yield in Long Decline, Despite Shell’s Claims, “International Herald Tribune”, April 9,
2004.
4 Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Country Analysis Briefs, Oman”, October 2003, hllp:// 
www.eia.doe.gov.
5 These are all my calculations.
res, however, probably also need to be revised sińce (as the Energy Information 
Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy, or DOE, noted), “Most of 
Oman’s reserves are in PDO-owned areas” and “Most gas in Oman is associated 
with oil”6. This being the case, it would appear that the downward revision of 
Oman’s proven oil reserves would necessitate a downward revision of its gas rese- 
rves, too.
Despite this, the Omani economy has benefited from the fact that world oil 
prices have been relatively high. There is, of course, no gi arantee that oil prices 
will remain this high. And even if they do, Oman will not benefit from them when 
its petroleum reserves finally are depleted. Omani govemment officials have long 
claimed to be preparing the sultanate for when this happens by developing the non- 
oil economy in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, light industry, mining, and even 
tourism. Progress in these areas, though, has been limited.
In June 1995, the sultanate-sponsored “Vision Conference: Oman 2020” es- 
timated that the crude oil sector’s share of Omani GDP would fali from 41 percent 
in 1996 to 9 percent in 2020, the gas sector’s contribution would rise from 1 per­
cent to 10 percent, and the non-oil industrial sector’s contribution would rise from 
7.5 percent to 29 percent7. In late 2003, however, the DOE estimated that oil reve- 
nues still contributed almost 40 percent of Oman’s GDP as well as 75 percent of its 
export earnings. The Omani govemment has sought to increase the percentage of 
Omanis working in the private sector through an “Omanization” program aimed at 
reducing the Sultanate’s dependence on immigrant labor. According to the DOE, 
however, Omanis now constitute only 10 percent of private sector employment8.
Oman’s population growth was estimated at a rapid 2.2 percent in mid- 
20049, its population growth during the 1980’s and 1990’s is believed to have been 
close to an extremely rapid 4.0 percent10. From less than one million in 1970, 
Oman’s population has grown to 2.7 million in 200411.
According to the Population Reference Bureau, it is expected to reach 4.0 
million in 202512. According to J.E. Peterson, Oman is now facing “the dilemma of 
what to do with the addition of well over 40,000 secondary-school graduates and 
drop-outs every year”13. But if Oman’s oil income declines, this task will become 
far more difficult and the sultanate could face a serious crisis.
The Omani govemment does not publish unemployment figures. According 
to Peterson, though, Oman is now experiencing “serious unemployment pro­
blems”14. It appears doubtful, however, that either the declining oil sector or the
6 EIA, “Country Analysis Briefs, Oman”.
7 National Economy: An Overview, “Times o f Oman”, August 21, 2004, http://www.timesofoman. 
com/omaneconomy.asp.
8 EIA, “Country Analysis Briefs, Oman”.
9 Population Reference Bureau (PRB), 2004 World Population Data Sheet, Washington 2004.
10 J. E. P e te r so n , Oman: Three and a H alf Decades o f  Changę and Development, “Middle East Policy”, 
vol. 11, no. 2, Summer 2004, p. 135.
" Ibidem, and PRB, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.
12 PRB, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.
13 J. E. P e ter so n , Oman: Three and a H a lf Decades..., p. 135.
14 Ibidem.
smali non-oil sector will be able to absorb the growing number of young Omani job 
seekers. Govemment, of course, employs a substantial number of people, including 
a military establishment of 41,700* . But with defense expenditures alone accoun- 
ting for over 12 percent of Oman’s GNP, the ability of the govemment to employ 
more people productively also appears limited16.
Given that Oman’s population is growing rapidly, its petroleum reserves are 
much lower than previously thought, and its non-oil economy is limited, it appears 
that the sultanate will face a serious economic crisis in the next 10 to 15 years, or 
even sooner if oil prices plummet.
Political problems
Glowing reports about increasing political participation in Oman hołd out the pro- 
spect that the sultanate may be able to weather the impending economic storm it 
faces. But just like previous reports about Oman’s petroleum reserves, these reports 
appear to have been greatly overstated, too. Unfortunately, Oman’s political pro­
blems are so great that they are likely to severely constrain the sultanate’s ability to 
resolve its economic problems. These problems include: the extraordinary concen- 
tration of authority in the hands of one man (Sułtan Qaboos), the sultan’s unwillin- 
gness to allow meaningful political participation or dialogue, political legitimacy 
issues conceming both Sułtan Qaboos and the succession process he has set up, and 
sporadic but persistent signs of opposition.
In his book All in the Family, Michael Herb argued that Middle Eastem mo- 
narchies where power has been shared among members of the royal family have 
survived whereas those in which the monarch has excluded his family members 
from governance are the ones that have been overthrown17. While Oman is a coun­
try where the monarchy has not been overthrown, Herb noted that “the dynasty as 
a ruling institution is weaker” and that Sułtan Qaboos “has concentrated much po­
wer in his own hands, and shared less with his relatives than is common elsewhere 
in the G u lf’18.
The number of offices that Qaboos holds himself is remarkable: he is not 
only sułtan but also prime minister, defense minister, finance minister, foreign 
affairs minister, and chairman of the central bank. By contrast, the few relatives he 
has in his cabinet hołd fairly powerless positions: a cousin (Thuwayni) is the Suł­
ta n i  “special representative”; another cousin (Fahd) is deputy prime minister for 
cabinet affairs; yet another cousin (Faysal) is minister of national heritage and cul- 
ture; while an uncle (Shabib) is the sultan’s special adviser for environmentaI affa-
15 International Institute for Strategie Studies, The Military Balance, 2003-2004, London 2003, p. 118-
119.
16 CIA, “World Factbook 2004, Oman”.
17 M. H erb, A ll in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monar- 
chies, Albany 1999.
18 Ibidem, p. 180.
irs19. Furthermore, unlike the other Gulf monarchies where the successors to the 
throne have all been designated, Sułtan Qaboos has not named an heir but has cal- 
led upon the royal family to do so after his death. Sułtan Qaboos’s style of gover- 
nance has important implications.
Elsewhere in the Gulf, several members of each country’s ruling family have 
acąuired administrative experience through holding important cabinet positions. Upon 
the death or incapacity of the monarch, there are other members of the ruling family 
with senior-level administrative experience who can quickly s ep in. Herb argues that 
the ruling families in each of these countries serve as an important check on the mo­
narch, sińce the family ultimately has the power to depose him if he undertakes 
a course of ąction seen as harmful to the continuation of the dynasty20.
None of this is true in Oman. Qaboos has not allowed anybody else in the al- 
Said family to acąuire significant administrative experience. This will make the 
task of whoever succeeds him difficult. Unlike elsewhere in the Gulf, Oman’s royal 
family does not appear to have the power to restrain -  and certainly not to depose -  
Qaboos. Whereas the other Gulf monarchies are family enterprises, Oman is a sole 
proprietorship. The quality of Qaboos’s rule, then, is crucially important for 
Oman’s stability.
What can be said, then, about Qaboos’s rule? Qaboos came to power in 1970 
by overthrowing his father with the help of the British. Since the defeat of the Dho- 
far insurgency (which was supported by neighboring Marxist South Yemen) in 
1975, Oman has been extremely stable. By this standard, Qaboos’s rule so far must 
have been remarkably good. But even if stability is an adequate measure of the 
quality of his rule, there are reasons for concem.
With the passage of time, Sułtan Qaboos has reportedly become increasingly 
reclusive -  as was his father, Sułtan Said, toward the end of his long reign (1932- 
1970). What this suggests is that Qaboos has grown out of touch with his society. 
This observation may appear strange considering how Qaboos has made an annual 
“meet the people” tour of Oman throughout his reign. According to two people
I spoke to who have witnessed this event, however, this tour is a tightly stage- 
managed event designed to project an image of a sułtan in close contact with his 
people while actually “protecting” him from any such contact that has not been 
authorized and choreographed in advance. In addition, despite the vaunted 
“democratization” taking place in Oman (which will be discussed later), press fre- 
edom in Oman was rated by The Economist in 2004 as “dismal” (scoring only 1 on 
a 1-10 scalę -  worse even than in Saudi Arabia)21. In addition to not fulfilling the 
critical role played by a free press in a democratic or democratizing society, the
19 Ibidem, p. 153-154; and “CIA, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members o f Foreign Govemments”, http:// 
www.odci.gov/cia/publicalions/chiefs/chiefsl34.html, accessed April 14, 2003.
20 M. Herb, All in the Family..., p. 238.
Arab Democracy: Freedom Calls, at Last?, “The Economist”, April 3, 2004, p. 48. The unusual excep- 
tions to Oman’s bland media norm are the English language FM radio programs broadcast by one of the Sultan’s 
female cousins, Zawan Al-Said. Since most Omanis do not speak English, however, the impact o f her programs 
appears limited. M. W al la c e , O m an’s Siwek Joek, “The Times”, January 15, 2004, p. 2, 7.
Omani press is not a source of information for the sułtan about problems that are 
occurring which need to be addressed before they become worse.
This is a role, of course, that could be played by the Omani Majlis al-Shura. 
Beginning in 1982, this body (which has had several names) has gone from being 
completely appointed by the sułtan, to being selected by the “notables” of various 
regions (with the sułtan having finał approval), to the lower house in October 2003 
being “elected” on the basis of universal adult suffrage (the upper house is appoin­
ted by the Sułtan). The authority of this “parliament”, however, is strictly limited. 
It is not empowered to address important issues such as national security, foreign 
relations, or the political system. Instead, it is only allowed to deal with economic 
and social issues, the encouragement of investment, and administrative reform.
Even then, the Majlis may not initiate legislation, but can only comment on 
and propose amendments to laws submitted for its consideration by the Sułtan’s 
cabinet22.
Finally, candidates for Majlis seats in 2003 were forbidden to use the mass 
media for their political campaigns. Despite the fact that these were Oman’s first 
ever “national elections”, voter tumout was reportedly less than 25 percent. 
“Political analysts in Oman and the United States say the Iow numbers are due to 
the fact that most Omanis still do not feel they have a political voice”, reported The 
Times23. Whatever the sultan’s purpose in creating the Majlis al-Shura, it does not 
seem to be to share power sińce all meaningful decision-making authority remains 
in his hands.
Qaboos certainly has not given the Majlis any role in deciding the suc- 
cession. He has no children himself and has not named any of his relatives as his 
heir. The succession will instead be decided only after his death in the following 
manner as described by Qaboos himself: “When I die, my family will meet. If they 
cannot agree on a candidate, the Defense Council will decide, based on a name or 
names submitted by the previous sułtan. I have already written down two names in 
descending order, and put them in sealed envelopes in two different regions”24.
It is possible that this process will work smoothly. But several problems 
could arise: 1) the royal family might not be able to agree on a successor, or even 
on who among them should be in on the decision; 2) even if it cannot decide, the 
royal family might not be willing to let the Defense Council do so, or royal rivals 
might vie for allies on it; and 3) different versions of Qaboos’s list of successors 
might suddenly be “found”, thus causing greater confusion. These problems might 
be avoided if only the sułtan would name an heir, as has been done in all the other 
Gulf monarchies. But sińce Qaboos overthrew a sułtan when he himself was heir, 
he may well fear that any heir he named might do the same to him. The possibility 
of an unstable succession, though, is a high price to pay for the continued stability 
of Qaboos’s own reign.
22 A. Jum a A lh a j, The Political Elitę and the Introduction o f  Political Participation in Oman, “Middle 
East Policy”, vol. 7, no. 3, June 2000, p. 103-7.
23 M. W a 11 a c e, Oman ’.v Shock Jock...
24 J. M ille r , Creating Modern Oman: An Interview witli Sułtan Qabus, “Foreign Affairs”, vol. 76, no. 3, 
May/June 1997, p. 17.
A contested succession, of course, could threaten the legitimacy of the sulta­
nate. Bom in 1940, Sułtan Qaboos could still rule effectively for another 15 to 20 
years. If this is indeed how long he continues to rule, then Oman’s succession crisis 
will occur at approximately the same time that it runs out of oil -  thereby serving to 
exacerbate popular disaffection with the regime. But questions about the legitimacy 
of the regime may not lie dormant until the death of Sułtan Qaboos. Some Omanis 
appear to have serious doubts about Sułtan Qaboos’s legitimacy and suitability as 
a ruler.
As is well known, Islam has two main branches: Sunni and Shi’a. Oman, 
though, is one of the few Muslim countries where adherents of a third branch -  
Ibadhism -  are prevalent. (Ibadhism is the only extant branch of Kharijsm, Islam’s 
earliest schism. Ibadhism is conservative, but tolerant of other forms of Islam. 
A traditional belief of the Ibadhis is that their Imam should be the most worthy 
person of the Ibadhi community, that he was to be chosen by the community’s 
notables, and that he could be removed from office if he proved himself unworthy 
of it.)25 Further, Oman is the only Muslim country where the rulers -* including 
Sułtan Qaboos -  have traditionally been Ibadhis. According to the CIA, 75 percent 
of the Omani population is Ibadhi while the remaining 25 percent is either Sunni, 
Shi’a, or Hindu26. This suggests that while Oman is not a democracy, Sułtan Qabo- 
os hails from the majority community within Oman. Other sources indicate, ho- 
wever, that the Ibadhis form a much smaller percentage of the population. Accor­
ding to J.E. Peterson -  one of the foremost Western scholars on Oman -  the 
indigenous population of the Sultanate is 45 percent Ibadhi, 50 percent Sunni, and 
less than 5 percent Shi’a and Hindu27. Dale Eickelman -  also one of the foremost 
Western scholars on Oman -  estimated that, “Roughly 50-55 percent of its citizen 
population is Sunni, 40-45 percent is Ibadhi, and less than 2 percent is Shi’a”28.
If these two scholars’ estimates are correct, then the sułtan does not hail 
from the majority community within Oman, but from a minority (albeit a large one 
that has been traditionally dominant). Sunnis elsewhere -  especially in Saudi Ara­
bia -  have an extremely negative view of Ibadhism29. It is not elear whether the 
Sunnis of Oman share this view. It is highly probable, though, that the majority 
Sunnis resent being ruled by the Ibadhi minority. One account of the arrest in 1994 
of hundreds of regime opponents said that “Most of them were Sunni Muslims”30, 
suggesting the presence of just such resentment in this community.
25 J. D uke A n th o n y , Historical and Cultural Dictionary o f  the Sultanate o f  Oman and the Emirates o f  
Eastem Arabia, Metuchen 1976; and A. H ou ran i, A History o f  the Arab Peoples, Cambridge 1991, p. 39.
26 CIA, “World Factbook 2004, Oman”.
27 J. E. P e te r so n , O m an's Diverse Society: Northern Oman, “Middle East Journal”, vol. 58, no. 1, Win­
ter 2004, n. 32.
2 D. F. E ic k e lm a n , Kings and People: Information and Authority in Oman, Qatar, and the Persian 
Gulf, [in:] J. A. K e c h ic h ia n  (ed.), Iran, Iraą, and the Arab G ulf States, New York 2001, p. 202.
29 Ibidem, p. 202-204; and N. E. O baid , The Oil Kingdom a t 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Ara­
bia, Washington 2000, p. 88-89.
30 A. Jum a A l-H a j, The Politics o f  Participation in the G ulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani 
Consultative Council, “Middle East Journal”, vol. 50, no. 3, Autumn 1996, p. 567.
Resentment of Sułtan Qaboos, though, may even be present in the Ibadhi 
community. According to John C. Wilkinson, temporal and spiritual authority in 
Oman was traditionally exercised by an Ibadhi Imam. The Ibadhi imamate was, at 
least in theory, elected by the faithful on the basis of his personal ąualifications. 
Many elections to the Imamate in the past, though, had not been regarded as legi- 
timate, and this led to civil wars among the Ibadhis. Ibadhi political theory allowed 
for an imam to be deposed by the faithful if he became incapacitated or acted aga­
inst the precepts of Islam, and some have indeed been deposed. Ibadhi political 
theory “rigorously excluded... any notion of a hereditary imamate”, though it ten- 
ded to be dominated by different families in different periods31.
According to Wilkinson, the imamate has experienced repeated historical 
cycles in which it has “always declined into dynastie power, but equally inevitably 
re-emerged as the national ideology reuniting the State”32. At times, Wilkinson 
records, the imamate has disappeared altogether due to defeat by foreign or non- 
imamate Omani forces, but its memory has always remained among the Omanis 
who have restored it whenever the opportunity arose.
From the 1850s until the 1950s, there existed two power centers in Oman: 
the imamate in the interior of the country and the sultanate on the coast which was 
backed by the British. There were several clashes between the two in which the 
sultanate would have been defeated completely had it not been for the intervention 
of British forces. In the mid-twentieth century, however, oil was discovered in 
interior Oman. The sultan’s British-backed forces overran the imamate in 1955. 
With Saudi support, the imamate leadership regrouped and launched a rebellion in 
1957 which took the British two years to crush. The imamate then came to an 
end33. Memory of the imamate tradition, however, may well have survived. If so, 
Sułtan Qaboos is vulnerable on three counts: 1) he was not elected by the Ibadhi 
faithful (or anybody else); 2) the imamate tradition allows for a leader to be depo­
sed if he becomes incapacitated or acts against the precepts of Islam; and 3) many 
Omanis (Ibadhis, Sunnis, and Shi’as) believe that Qaboos has indeed acted against 
the precepts of Islam in one important respect. Sułtan Qaboos has been reported by 
several sources to be a homosexual, which would not be judged favorably by his 
subjects if they were to believe this claim, whether or not it was true.
What Omanis think about this issue is hard to determine. Although I have 
been following Omani affairs for over two decades, only three Omanis have di- 
scussed this subject with me openly34. Although such a tiny number may not be 
representative of an entire society’s opinion, their statements on this matter indicate 
that it has wider political implications:
-  All three agreed that the Sułtan is generally believed to be homosexual by 
Omanis;
31 J. C. W ilk in s o n , The Imamate Tradition o f  Oman, Cambridge 1987, p. 169-176.
32 Ibidem, p. 4.
33 Ibidem, p. 299-328.
34 Several Amerieans and Saudis familiar with Oman have also discussed this topie with me, but their 
views are not being examined here.
-  All three agreed that Omanis only discuss this subject with trusted relatives and 
friends sińce more open discussion of it could result in negative consequences 
(including imprisonment);
-  All three agreed that all Omanis whom they have discussed this subject with 
believe that the Sułtan’s alleged homosexuality raises serious doubts as to his 
legitimacy as a ruler.
One of the three -  a young Westem-educated małe related to one of those arrested 
in 1994 -  stated vehemently that Qaboos’s alleged homosexuality is utterly shame- 
ful, that it reflects badly on Oman as a whole, and that it completely undermines 
Qaboos’s legitimacy as sułtan. The second -  a young Westem-educated female -  
saw the Sultan’s alleged homosexuality as causing Omanis both to see him as ridi- 
culous and to discount or disregard much of what he has dońe that has benefited 
the country. The third -  an older Middle Eastem-educated małe -  indicated that the 
sułtan is widely believed to spend an inordinate amount of Oman’s scarce resour- 
ces on his reputedly numerous paramours and on projects favored by them.
If these views are at all representative, then the sułtan’s alleged homosexu- 
ality could become an important political factor in the event of a regime crisis, or in 
aggravating events that might lead to a regime crisis.
How likely, though, is this?
Oman has experienced two rebellions within living memory: the imamate 
rebellion from 1957 to 1959 and the Dhofar rebellion from 1965 to 1975. The for­
mer, though, took place during the reign of the sułtan’s father. While the latter 
gained strength during Sułtan Said’s finał years, it lost strength and was finally 
defeated under Sułtan Qaboos. While there has been no rebellion on this scalę sińce 
the 1970s, opposition activity has occurred in Oman sińce the mid-1990s. And 
unlike the two earlier rebellions, this more recent activity has been aimed directly 
at Sułtan Qaboos. This activity includes:
-  The arrest in May 1994 of hundreds of “opponents” of the regime. It appears 
that those arrested did not advocate the overthrow of the Sultanate, but its re­
form instead. Those arrested included a number of high-ranking officials and 
members of prominent families. Most appear to have been Sunnis. Those arre­
sted were treated quite harshly. According to Omani sources, the public did not 
see these people as a threat, but saw the govemment’ s treatment of them as un- 
fair. All those arrested were later reported to have been released35. Far from an 
act of forgiveness on the part of the sułtan, however, their release was seen as 
belated acknowledgement that there was no need to have arrested them in the 
first place. Instead of ąuelling opposition, the sultanate’s actions in this instan­
ce appear to have led to resentment against what many Omanis saw as the re­
gime’s arbitrariness.
35 For reporting on these events, see Unusual Human Rights Abuses in the Unusually Quiet Sultanate o f  
Oman, “Solidarity International for Human Rights”, September 30, 1994; S. A b d u lla h , Omani Islamism: An 
Unexpected Confrontation with the Govemment, “United Association for Studies and Research”, Occasional 
Papers Series, no. 8, September 1995; and A. Jum a A l-H a j, The Politics o f  Participation in the G u lf Coopera­
tion Council States..., p. 566-568.
-  In September 1995, Sułtan Qaboos survived an automobile accident in which 
his finance minister, Qays al-Zawawi, was killed36. According to one Omani 
source, the sułtan used to drive around at night by himself or with a friend 
“incognito” . According to this same source, the car crash Qaboos survived was 
not an accident but a deliberate assassination attempt, and that many arrests 
were made following it.
-  Since 1996, according to Dale Eickelman, Oman has experienced “public 
expressions of discontent in the form of occasional student demonstrations, 
anonymous leaflets, and other rather creative forms of public communication.
-  Only in Oman has the occasional donkey been used as a mobile billboard to 
express anti-regime sentiments. There is no way in which police can maintain 
dignity in seizing and destroying a donkey on whose flank a political message 
has been inscribed”37.
-  In 1997, a few Shi’as (apparently thought to be opponents of the regime) were 
arrested38.
-  Since September 11, 2001, there have been a number of demonstrations in 
which police have employed force to control protesters and have detained some 
of them39. Although the demonstrators were ostensibly protesting against Ame­
rican foreign policy, their actions could be (and undoubtedly were) seen as an 
implicit criticism of Sułtan Qaboos’s policy of close ties to Washington.
-  An alleged al-Qa’ida celi was broken up in 200240.
-  A number of Omani Ibadis were arrested in December 2004/January 2005. 
Thirty were convicted of plotting to “overthrow the regime... and replace it 
with an imamate”. Hundreds reportedly demonstrated when the sentences were 
announced in May 200541.
Conclusion
While political discontent is obviously present in Oman, the sultan’s regime does 
not appear to be in any immediate danger. While Omani oil production has fal len 
and its level of reserves is lower than was believed, the current high price of oil has 
provided a welcome economic cushion for Oman. And so long as the govemment 
is able to provide a decent standard of living, most Omanis seem prepared to tole- 
rate Sułtan Qaboos’s rule even if they ąuestion his legitimacy and see the 
“democratization” process he has begun as largely meaningless.
34 M. J. O ’ R ei 1 ly , Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Futurę, “Middle East Journal”, vol. 
52, no. 1, Winter 1998, p. 82.
37 D. F. E ic k e lm a n , Kings and People..., p. 201.
38 J. E. P e te r so n , Oman: Three and a H alf Decades ofC hange and Development..., p. 135.
39 U.S. Department o f State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Hu­
man Rights Practices” 2003, February 25; http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hiTpt/2003/27935pf.htm.
40 Peterson, Oman: Three and a H alf Decades o f  Change and Development..., p. 135.
41 S. K. V a id y a , Trial o f  Suspected Omani Ejctremists Gets Under Way, “Gulf News”, April 19, 2005; 
and Supporters o fJa iled  Omanis Stage Protest, “Gulf News”, May 4, 2005.
Oman, though, will face serious economic problems if the price of oil falls 
and stays Iow, Oman’s petroleum reserves become depleted, or both.
Indeed, it appears almost inevitable that Oman will face such a crisis before 
too long. Dealing successfully with it will be all the more difficult as a result of the 
sultan’s relative isolation and his unwillingness to share power either within the 
royal family or with the Majlis, and to name an heir. If, however, Omani living 
standards decline significantly, Sułtan Qaboos’s govemance and “un-Islamic” life- 
style could well become rallying points for opposition ag.iinst him. A contested 
succession, especially under conditions of economic decline, could also lead to 
political instability.
Finally, while the political opposition in Oman is not strong now, this could 
change if Oman faces economic and political crises simultaneously.
While Oman is arguably better off than most states in the Middle East, it also 
appears to have a much more limited political capacity for dealing with a severe 
economic crisis than many of these other countries where a State of crisis is the 
norm.
